

SECRET NOFORN

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S E C R E T NOFORN MAC 6016 INTEL SECTION TWO OF THREE
 QUOTE:

A SIGNIFICANT FEATURE OF THE INTRODUCTION OF REGULAR PAVN UNIT NINTO THE RVN IS THE INCREASING RATE OF INFILTRATION. IN CONTRAST TO THE EARLY RATE OF 3 BATTALION EQUIVALENTS PER MONTH DURING THE LATTER HALF OF 1964 THERE IS GROWING EVIDENCE THAT THE DRV HAS SENT AS MANY AS 12 BATTALIONS PER MONTH, FOR EXAMPLE, THE INFILTRATION OF THE U/I QUANG TRI, 250TH, THE "SONG LAM" AND 66TH PAVN REGIMENTS WHICH ALL LEFT THE DRV IN LATE JUNE AND EARLY JULY OF THIS YEAR. (VUGRAPH NO. 1 OFF). THIS ACCELERATED INFILTRATION RATE WAS PROBABLY DUE TO SEVERAL FACTORS, THE PRIMARY ONE BEING THE DRV REVISION OF THEIR ESTIMATE OF THE FORCES NEEDED TO MAINTAIN "STRATEGIC MOBILITY" IN VIEW OF THE EXPECTED BUILDUP OF US AND OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES. THE APPARENT NEED OF HANOI AND THE VIET CONG FOR A MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY TO ILLUSTRATE THAT THE COMMUNISTS STILL RETAINED THE INITIATIVE AND TO BOOST HOMEFRONT MORALE COULD HAVE BEEN AMONG THE SEVERAL FACTORS.

DURING THE TIME THAT PAVN REGIMENTS WERE INFILTRATING, THE INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE CADRE PERSONNEL DESTINED FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY UNITS AND ORGANIZATIONS ALSO CONTINUED. AT THE SAME TIME NEW VC UNITS WERE BEING FORMED IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

A COMPARISON OF VC/PAVN ORDER OF BATTLE INTELLIGENCE IS SHOWN HERE. (VUGRAPH NO. 2 ON)

IN JULY 1964 OUR ORDER OF BATTLE INTELLIGENCE CARRIED A TOTAL OF 46 VC BATTALIONS. IN NOVEMBER 1965 WE HELD 83 VC BATTALIONS PLUS THE 27 INFILTRATED PAVN BATTALIONS FOR A TOTAL OF 110 (103 CONFIRMED, 4 PROBABLE AND 3 POSSIBLE BATTALIONS). (VUGRAPH NO. 2 OFF)

NOW LET US EXAMINE ENEMY MANPOWER AND LOGISTICAL RESOURCES. (VUGRAPH NO. 3 ON) TRAINED MILITARY FORCES LOCATED IN THE DRV INCLUDE: 265,000 REGULAR ARMY, 27,000 ARMED SECURITY FORCE, 200,000 CLASS I MILITIA AND A POTENTIAL OF 1.8 MILLION MILITIA. COMPOSITION OF THE REGULAR ARMY IS SHOWN BELOW. (PAUSE) WITHIN THIS FORCE STRUCTURE (FLIP ON), THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 38 INFANTRY REGIMENTS. THE CLASS I MILITIA PROVIDES A TRAINED POOL OF PERSONNEL FOR THE REGULAR ARMY AND PAVN IS CAPABLE OF MOBILIZING 475,000 MEN BY M-DAY PLUS 180. (VUGRAPH NO. 3 OFF)

OF THE 38 PAVN INFANTRY REGIMENTS IN THE DRV DIA CONSIDERS 14 TO CONSTITUTE THE STRATEGIC RESERVES. THIS LEAVES 24 REGIMENTS WHICH COULD BE USED TO CADRE AND TRAIN NEW UNITS (VUGRAPH NO. 4 ON). IF THE PAVN UTILIZE 11 OF THESE AS TRAINING REGIMENTS AND EACH TRAINS A NEW LIGHT INFANTRY REGIMENT EVERY 90 DAYS THEN THE DRV CAN TRAIN 36 NEW REGIMENTS BY THE END OF 1966. PROVIDING 9 OF THEIR CURRENT REGULAR REGIMENTS ARE READY TO INFILTRATE, OR HAVE ALREADY TRAINED NEW REGIMENTS, THE DRV CAN MAINTAIN AN INFILTRATION RATE OF 3 REGIMENTS PER MONTH AT LEAST THROUGH 1966.

DIA and JCS review(s) completed.

(VUGRAPH NO. 4 OFF)

UNQUOTE:

EXPLANATORY NOTE IN ABSENCE OF VUGRAPH FOUR:

THE FOREGOING 1966 TRAINING CAPABILITY IS BASED ON MACV'S ASSUMPTION THAT THE DRV WOULD SPREAD OUT TRAINING INPUT TO 3 REGTS FIRST MONTH AND 4 REGTS THE NEXT TWO MONTHS AND THEN REPEAT THIS CYCLE + END EXPLANATORY NOTE.

QUOTE:

IN SOUTH VIETNAM THE VIETCONG CONTROL A MANPOWER POOL OF 526,000 PHYSICALLY FIT MALES BETWEEN THE AGES OF 16 - 45. THEY ALSO HAVE A WELL ESTABLISHED GUERRILLA BASE AND TRAINING SYSTEM. WE ESTIMATE THAT THEY CAN FORM TWO NEW BATTALIONS EACH MONTH AND CAN TRAIN AT LEAST 2,500 REPLACEMENTS MONTHLY. BASED UPON A VC BATTALION STRENGTH OF 500 THESE TRAINEES WOULD EQUATE TO 5 BATTALIONS.

(VUGRAPH NO. 5 ON) THIS VUGRAPH SHOWS THE PAVN/VC CAPABILITY TO INCREASE THEIR STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THIS IS EXPRESSED IN BATTALION EQUIVALENTS BECAUSE SOME TRAINEES WILL BE FORMED INTO NEW UNITS WHILE OTHERS WILL BE REPLACEMENTS.

THE PAVN CAN TRAIN AND INFILTRATE 9 BATTALION EQUIVALENTS PER MONTH AND THE VC SEVEN FOR A TOTAL OF 16. (VUGRAPH NO. 5 OFF)

LET US NOW DETERMINE HOW MANY OF THESE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS ARE REQUIRED TO REPLACE LOSSES. (VUGRAPH NO. 6 ON)

THE BARS ON THIS VUGRAPH REPRESENT THE PAVN/VC AVERAGE QUARTERLY LOSSES. THESE LOSSES INCLUDE KILLED, CAPTURED, DESERTERS AND RALLIERS.

THE PROJECTED LOSSES PER QUARTER IS A STRAIGHT LINE PROJECTION BASED UPON THE AVERAGE QUARTERLY INCREASE IN LOSSES. THIS AMOUNTS TO ABOUT 4.5 BATTALION EQUIVALENTS PER QUARTER. THE BATTALION EQUIVALENT LOSSES PER QUARTER ARE SHOWN ON THE TOP OF EACH BAR GRAPH. (FLIP ON) THIS FLIP SHOWS THE BATTALION EQUIVALENT INPUTS EACH QUARTER BASED UPON THE 9 PAVN AND 7 VC INPUTS PER MONTH PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED OR 48 PER QUARTER. SUBJECTING LOSSES FROM INPUTS WE OBTAIN THE NET GAIN PER QUARTER. BY THE LAST QUARTER OF 1966 LOSSES EQUAL INPUT. BY THAT TIME ANNUAL GAIN OF 45 BATTALION EQUIVALENTS WILL HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. ADDING THESE 45 TO THE CURRENT 110 WE CAN PROJECT A FORCE STRENGTH EQUIVALENT TO 155 BATTALIONS BY THE END OF 1966.

(VUGRAPH NO. 6 OFF)

UNQUOTE:

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